초록 열기/닫기 버튼
본 연구는 K-IFRS의 도입 이전과 이후인 2009년과 2011년에 비상장기업의 감사보수 자료를 이용하여 K-IFRS를 자발적으로 도입한 비상장기업과 도입하지 않은 비상장기업간의 감사보수에 차이가 있는지와 각각의 비상장기업의 도입 이전과 이후간의 감사보수에 차이가 있는지 여부를 비교･분석하였다. 그리고 비상장기업이 K-IFRS를 자발적으로 도입하는 요인이 무엇인지를 살펴보았다. 감사보수에 대한 분석결과, K-IFRS를 자발적으로 도입한 비상장기업의 감사보수가 도입하지 않은 비상장기업에 비해 이전과 이후에 모두 유의적으로 높다는 것을 확인하였다. 또한 K-IFRS를 자발적으로 도입한 비상장기업의 감사보수가 도입하기 이전보다 이후에 유의하게 증가하는 결과를 보였으나, 도입하지 않은 비상장기업은 반대의 결과를 보였다. 대응표본을 이용한 추가분석의 결과에서 K-IFRS 도입 이전인 2009년에 자발적으로 도입한 비상장기업과 도입하지 않은 비상장기업간의 감사보수에 유의한 차이가 없는 결과를 보였으나, K-IFRS 도입 이후인 2011년에는 유의한 차이가 있다는 결과를 보였다. 또한 물가상승률을 고려한 추가분석의 결과에서 K-IFRS를 자발적으로 도입한 비상장기업의 도입 이전과 이후의 감사보수에 유의한 차이가 없다는 결과를 보였으나, 도입하지 않은 기업의 도입 이전과 이후의 감사보수는 유의한 음(-)의 부호를 보였다. 따라서 K-IFRS의 도입이 감사보수의 증가에 영향을 미친다는 것을 알 수 있다. 자발적 도입 특성에 대한 분석결과, 상장기업의 종속기업인 비상장기업과 상장 예정인 비상장기업이 K-IFRS를 자발적으로 도입하는 결과를 확인하였다. 또한 자산규모가 크고, 부채비율이 낮고, 성장률이 높은 비상장기업일수록 K-IFRS를 자발적으로 도입한다는 결과를 보였다. 그리고 K-IFRS를 자발적으로 도입하는 비상장법인일수록 감사인을 Big 4 회계법인으로 교체하였다. 본 연구의 결과는 회계법인, 피감사기업, 감독당국에게 다양한 시사점을 제공하지만, 비상장기업에 대한 제한적인 자료의 접근과 K-IFRS 도입 전･후 각각 1개 연도만을 분석했다는 점에서 결과의 해석 및 적용에 주의할 필요가 있다.
We investigate whether the audit fees in the pre (FY 2009) and the post (FY 2011) of K-IFRS adoption between unlisted adopters and unlisted non-adopters are different, and which characteristics make unlisted companies adopt K-IFRS voluntarily. According to the result of audit fees, the level of audit fees of unlisted adopters is significantly higher than that of unlisted non-adopters in both of the pre and the post of K-IFRS adoption. In case of unlisted adopters, the level of audit fees of the post of K-IFRS adoption is significantly higher than that of the pre of K-IFRS adoption. In case of unlisted non-adopters, however, the opposite result is shown. With matching sample, the level of audit fees between unlisted adopters and non-adopters is not significantly different in the pre (FY 2009) of K-IFRS adoption, but the level of audit fees of unlisted adopters is significantly higher than that of unlisted non-adopters in the post (FY 2011) of K-IFRS adoption. Additionally, the level of audit fees of unlisted adopters between the pre (FY 2009) and the post (FY 2011) of K-IFRS adoption is not significantly different after adjusting with inflation. From the result of characteristics of voluntary adoption, unlisted companies adopt K-IFRS voluntarily if they are the subsidiaries of listed companies or they prepare IPO (initial public offering). They also adopt K-IFRS more voluntarily as the assets are greater, the liability ratio lower, and the growth rate higher. And voluntary unlisted K-IFRS adopters are likely to change auditor to Big 4. The suggestions for improvement about audit market and audit fees of unlisted companies are as follows. First, the supervisory authority has to make a guideline of audit fees for unlisted companies to regulate the excessively low audit fees. Second, accounting firms need not to unnecessarily compete with one another, which means that accounting firms need to compete by audit quality not by audit fees to maintain proper audit fees. Third, unlisted companies need to adopt K-IFRS mandatorily because accounting comparability among unlisted companies is likely to drop if the supervisory authority permit two GAAP system as current situation. The results of our study provide some implications to auditors, unlisted companies, and regulators. First, auditors have to input sufficient audit time and effort and charge proper audit fees to improve audit-quality. Second, unlisted companies have to do their best to increase the credibility and the transparency of their financial information. Especially, voluntary unlisted K-IFRS adopters have to make an effort to provide high-quality financial information to keep up with the goal of K-IFRS adoption. Third, the supervisory authority has to monitor unnecessary competition among audit firms to maintain proper audit fees and to improve audit quality. The regulator also has to make a policy to mitigate the concentration of auditors to Big 4 because this phenomenon is getting obvious after the adoption of K-IFRS. Finally, the number of unlisted companies that should be audited by independent auditors is expected to reduce by 2,000 because the limit of assets whose companies should be audited revised from 10 billion won to 12 billion won according to the regulation about audit. Therefore, it is necessary to expand the mandatory auditees to increase accounting transparency and credibility. Oh et al.(2009) document that unlisted companies with qualified audit opinion pay lower audit fee while listed companies with qualified audit opinion pay higher audit fees. They interpret the result that auditors are likely to require compensation of the increased audit risk for listed companies with qualified audit opinion while auditors are likely to burden the risk of auditor switch for unlisted companies with qualified audit opinion because auditees have more audit bargaining power than incumbent auditors in case of unlisted companies. Park and Park(2013) document that the level of earnings management (both of real and accrual-based) of unlisted companies are lower as abnormal audit fees are much higher. They interpret the result that excessively low audit fees would deteriorate audit quality, and their result support to regulate excessively low audit fees and to make unlisted companies pay proper audit fees. Even though this study provides various implications to auditors, unlisted companies, and regulators, it has some limitations about shortage and short-window data of unlisted companies. Therefore, it is necessary to carefully use or apply the results of this study.
키워드열기/닫기 버튼
IFRS, K-IFRS, audit fee, unlisted companies
