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The paper discusses a theory by Aelius Aristides, a Greek rhetor of the second century AD, about the relationship between rhetoric and law. This theory appears in Aristides’ long treatise To Plato: In Defence of Rhetoric (cf. 205-234 Behr) as a part of his effort to defend his discipline, i. e. rhetoric, against Plato’s accusations. The paper will present Aristides’ views on the matter of law-rhetoric relationship and it will also try to trace back the roots of his basic ideas. The possible connection between Aristides’ theory and its own age will be also explored. Before closing the paper, I will shortly argue that Aristides, due to this theory, can be regarded as a forerunner of modern theories advocating the close relationship of rhetoric and law. Aelius Aristides writes on law and rhetoric in the heart of the Second Sophistic (in the middle of the second century AD), when rhetoric plays a prominent role in the society of the eastern parts of the Empire. He discusses the subject of the origin of rhetoric, as well as that of the relationship of rhetoric to legislation and to justice. Rhetoric and persuasion came, according to him, as a remedy for the lack of equality and justice in society. Legislation, Aristides maintains, is a part of rhetoric, since the nature of law is the same as that of rhetoric (its mission is to secure justice in society)• legislation is, however, subordinate to rhetoric, since rhetoric is absolutely indispensable for introducing legislation and enacting laws. Moreover, dispensation of justice is not possible without the aid of rhetoric. Aristides stresses that it belongs to rhetoric’s nature to defend just and only just laws. Aristides’ theory exploits positions and ideas used by great thinkers of the classical era (Gorgias, Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle). The only point of Aristides’ discussion which brings specific contemporary elements into the argumentation is the downgrading of jurors, who are placed halfway between the positions of orators and those of public executioners. Finally, I am suggesting that Aristides’ rhetorical conception of law is not only linked to the relevant ideas of the ancient times, but also to the modern conception of law as a part of rhetoric. Well-known modern theories such as those by Toulmin, Perelman, Viehweg, and Esser take law, implicitly or explicitly, as a part of rhetoric and, in this respect, they work within the framework set by Aristides. Besides, there are modern trends in legal education which are very close to Aristides’ educational implications, and also rhetorical conceptions of law (see, e.g., White) that seem to just reproduce Aristides’ ideas.
