본 논문은 90년대 중반 이후 김정일 정권이 채택해 온 ‘선군정치’와, 2002년 시행된 ‘7·1경제관리개선조치’(이하 ‘7·1조치’) 등 ‘북한식’ 경제개혁 간 긴장된 병행의 논리를 설명하고자 한다. 특히 ‘선군정치’의 기능 및 이의 실현을 위한 조건의 검토를 통해 ‘7·1조치’를 재평가하되, 시장개혁의 측면뿐 아니라 재정개혁의 측면에 보다 주목함으로써 양자 간 병행에 내재한 논리를 밝힌다. 90년대에 이르면 북한에선 자생적 시장화가 확대되어 김정일 체제를 대내적으로 위협하는 주된 요인이 됐고, 북미 간의 관계가 교착함에 따라 대외적 위협 요인도 커졌다. 북한당국은 ‘선군정치’의 기능적 측면에 대한 제고를 통해 이에 대응해 왔다. 한편 2002년에는 ‘7·1조치’ 및 그 후속조치를 통해 일부 시장기제를 도입하고 자원배분을 보다 효율적으로 하고자 했다. 이는 남북관계 및 북일관계 진전, 개성공단 및 금강산 사업 등으로 인해 발생한 외화유입 등과 맞물려 북한이 위기국면에서 벗어나는 데 일부 기여하였다. 그러나 북미관계의 교착이 근본적으로 해소되지 않는 한 공급능력 개선은 지속적일 수 없다. 따라서 ‘선군정치’적 군사국가의 유지 역시 불가피한 선택이었으며, 이러한 맥락에서 인민경제 자원을 국가재정으로 더 많이 이전시키고자 전략적으로 ‘7·1조치’가 시행된 일면이 분명히 있다. 따라서 ‘7·1조치’의 재정개혁적 측면은 ‘선군정치’와 ‘북한식’ 경제개혁 양자의 긴장된 병행이 가능토록 하는 매개적 근거가 되는 바, 김정일 정권의 ‘역설적이지만 현실적인’ 이중화 전략을 방증한다고 하겠다.

This paper explains the strained parallel logic between the "Military-first Politics," adopted by Kim Jong-Il's regime after the mid 1990s, and the "North Korean" economic reform such as the "The July Measures for Improving Economic Management"(7·1 Measures) enforced in 2002. While reevaluating the "7·1 Measures" particularly through examination of functions and conditions for its "Military-first Politics," aspects not only of market reform but also, and more, of financial reform will be observed, thereby establishing the embedded logic between the two movements. By 1990s in North Korea, self-generating marketization expanded to become the main cause of internal threat to Kim Jong-Il's regime, while elements of external threat also expanded as the US-DPRK relationship came to a deadlock. North Korean authorities have coped with these threats by promoting two functional aspects of the "Military-first Politics," such as "surveillance state" and "Defense Industry-first Principle." On the other hand, in 2002 they have imported parts of the market mechanism through the "7·1 Measures" and its follow-up measures, and have tried to carry out a more efficient resource allocation. Engaged with advancement of inter-Korean relations and Japan-DPRK relations, and inflow of foreign currency generated by the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mt. Keumgang tour, these efforts has had partly contributed to North Korea's overcoming a crisis. However, as long as the deadlock relationship between North Korea and US dissolves improvement of supply capability cannot be sustained, and the deepening of self-generating marketization will enlarge the likelihood of reinforcement the function of a "surveillance state." Therefore, maintaining "Military-first Politics" and "military state" was an inevitable choice, and it can also be identified, within this context, that the "7·1 Measures" was enforced strategically in order to transfer more resources of the people's economy to government finance. Such aspects of financial reformation in the "7·1 Measures" acts as an intermediary basis that makes strained parallelism between "Military-first Politics" and "North Korean" economic reform feasible, and also verifies Kim Jong-Il regime's "paradoxical yet realistic" dual strategy.

This paper explains the strained parallel logic between the "Military-first Politics," adopted by Kim Jong-Il's regime after the mid 1990s, and the "North Korean" economic reform such as the "The July Measures for Improving Economic Management"(7·1 Measures) enforced in 2002. While reevaluating the "7·1 Measures" particularly through examination of functions and conditions for its "Military-first Politics," aspects not only of market reform but also, and more, of financial reform will be observed, thereby establishing the embedded logic between the two movements. By 1990s in North Korea, self-generating marketization expanded to become the main cause of internal threat to Kim Jong-Il's regime, while elements of external threat also expanded as the US-DPRK relationship came to a deadlock. North Korean authorities have coped with these threats by promoting two functional aspects of the "Military-first Politics," such as "surveillance state" and "Defense Industry-first Principle." On the other hand, in 2002 they have imported parts of the market mechanism through the "7·1 Measures" and its follow-up measures, and have tried to carry out a more efficient resource allocation. Engaged with advancement of inter-Korean relations and Japan-DPRK relations, and inflow of foreign currency generated by the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mt. Keumgang tour, these efforts has had partly contributed to North Korea's overcoming a crisis. However, as long as the deadlock relationship between North Korea and US dissolves improvement of supply capability cannot be sustained, and the deepening of self-generating marketization will enlarge the likelihood of reinforcement the function of a "surveillance state." Therefore, maintaining "Military-first Politics" and "military state" was an inevitable choice, and it can also be identified, within this context, that the "7·1 Measures" was enforced strategically in order to transfer more resources of the people's economy to government finance. Such aspects of financial reformation in the "7·1 Measures" acts as an intermediary basis that makes strained parallelism between "Military-first Politics" and "North Korean" economic reform feasible, and also verifies Kim Jong-Il regime's "paradoxical yet realistic" dual strategy.

Military-first Politics, North Korean economic reform, 7.1 Measures, surveilance state, Defense Industry-first Principle, financial reform