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Levinasian philosophy is significant in that it regards ethics as "first philosophy," which can be summed up in a "face-to-face" encounter with and infinite responsibility for the Other. Levinas's view on art, however, seems to be incompatible with his ethics because his notion of 'il y a' can be misunderstood as a selfish indulgence in art and consequent irresponsibility. According to traditional mimetic theory of art, the function of artistic works is unethical since they are not able to form a 'flesh and blood' relationship with the viewers. Furthermore, in the eternally frozen instant of art, it is impossible for us to participate in an ontological event, and thus, theoretically speaking, we cannot have a chance to take any responsibility for the Other. In this context, art can become idols that disable us from responding to the face of the Other. While Plato degrades an image as secondary to the original, Levinas conceptualizes an image as a "shadow," which deconstructs the traditional theory of artistic resemblance, and accordingly reveals the unstable relationship between an original and an image. With the Levinasian concept of shadow, we can transcend an ontological notion of our being, and finally experience the exteriority of the Other. The epistemological incomprehensibility of the Other, ironically, qualifies us to respond to the face of the Other 'ethically.' At this point, art is not separated from the world any more, but brings us to the "hither side" where we can experience 'ethical' as well as 'artistic' moment of "il y a." In this way, we can solve the ontological dilemma caused from a sense of autonomous responsibility. Then it can be said that Levinasian ethics is 'artistic,' and Levinas's view on art 'ethical.'
