본 연구에서는 선형대리인모형을 이용하여 기업내 부문간 상호관련성이 존재할 때 조직 내지 직무설계의 문제 그리고 유인과 보상의 문제를 다룬다. 특히 모든 부문을 단일관리자가 관리하게 하는 단일관리자체제와 각 부문을 개별적인 관리자가 관리하는 별도관리자체제를 비교한다. 본 연구의 분석결과에 의하면 부문간 외부성을 내부화시키기 위해 단일관리자체제를 도입하여도 투자효율성의 문제는 발생하며 추가적인 정보가 존재하면 부분적으로 과소 및 과대 투자문제를 해결할 수 있다는 것을 보여주고 있다. 또한 별도의 관리자체제에서는 거래 상대방부문의 성과가 보상체계에 포함되며 원인은 다르지만 단일 관리자체제와 유사하게 과소/과대 투자문제 여전히 존재한다는 점을 확인할 수 있다. 또한 단일관리자체제와 비교하여 각 부문에서의 성과측정치(현금흐름)의 불확실성 정도에 따라 우월성이 달라질 수 있음을 보이고 있다. 결국 다른 조건에 동일하다면 각 조직에서의 성과측정치의 불확실성, 달리 표현하면 각 조직에서의 도덕적 해이의 정도에 따라 단일관리자체제와 별도관리자체제의 우월성이 결정됨을 알 수 있다.

This paper studies incentives, compensation and organization design problem using multiperson LEN agency model when there are interdependencies between divisions in the firm, where in one division, there is an investment and the other division benefits from the investment. Usually this externality between them necessitates cost allocation or more specifically transfer pricing. These accounting mechanisms contribute to resolve the conflicts between them, but imperfectly, which introduces rather fundamental solution i.e. reorganization, to remove externality in the firm. A Regime with single manager in charge of both divisions is to be considered and compared with that of two managers in charge of each division. Even under single manager regime, we find there is still more(less) investment than optimum and this problem is partially attenuated by additional information on investment. An additional information in this regime improves risk sharing or (and) investment efficiency. Nonfinancial information is one of the examples. We identify the conditions under which single manger regime is dominated by two-manager regime. Under certain conditions the principal is better off with single manager regime. The dominance between the two depends mainly on uncertainties of performance measure in each division.

This paper studies incentives, compensation and organization design problem using multiperson LEN agency model when there are interdependencies between divisions in the firm, where in one division, there is an investment and the other division benefits from the investment. Usually this externality between them necessitates cost allocation or more specifically transfer pricing. These accounting mechanisms contribute to resolve the conflicts between them, but imperfectly, which introduces rather fundamental solution i.e. reorganization, to remove externality in the firm. A Regime with single manager in charge of both divisions is to be considered and compared with that of two managers in charge of each division. Even under single manager regime, we find there is still more(less) investment than optimum and this problem is partially attenuated by additional information on investment. An additional information in this regime improves risk sharing or (and) investment efficiency. Nonfinancial information is one of the examples. We identify the conditions under which single manger regime is dominated by two-manager regime. Under certain conditions the principal is better off with single manager regime. The dominance between the two depends mainly on uncertainties of performance measure in each division.

Agency Model, Incentive, Compensation, Organization Design