초록 열기/닫기 버튼

헌법재판소의 결정과 그에 앞선 대법원 판결이 헌법 제10조에 근거를 둔 헌법상 기본권으로서 연명치료에 관한 자기결정권을 인정한 것은 중요한 진전이다. 헌재의 의견은 연명치료중단에 관한 자기결정권이 죽음에 임박한 환자에게 인정되는 기본권이며 생명단축의 권리, 곧 죽을 권리를 인정한 것으로 오해의 여지가 있는 논리를 펴고 있다. 향후 더욱 심도 있는 논의를 펴기 위해서는 기본권으로서의 연명치료거부권이 모든 국민(환자)에게 인정되는 기본권이라는 인식이 전제되어야 한다. 또한 연명치료 중단은 생명권과 밀접한 연관이 있지만 생명단축의 권리, 존엄사 혹은 죽을 권리의 인정여부와는 관련이 없음을 분명히 해야 한다.


The Constitutional Court of Korea (hereinafter "the Court") rendered a historical and landmark decision in 2008HunMa385 case decided on November 26, 2009. In that case, the Court recognized the right of self-determination to refuse life-sustaining treatment as one of the constitutional fundamental rights of a patient based on Article 10 of the Korean Constitution which guarantees all citizens the human dignity and worth and the right to pursue happiness. Prior to the decision of the Court, the Supreme Court of Korea, in Supreme Court en banc Decision 2009Da17417 decided May 21, 2009, also concluded that a patient who reaches the irrevocable death stage is allowed to ask discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment exercising the constitutional fundamental right of self-determination. Therefore, it is now settled in the Korean constitutional law that there is a 'constitutional fundamental right of self-determination to refuse life-sustaining treatment (hereinafter "the right")' even though discontinuance of the treatment may result in the death of the patient. However, it is the author's view that the Constitutional Court has erred, advertently or inadvertently, in the process of conceptualizing the right as a constitutional fundamental right in two folds. The Court first characterized that the patient who reaches the irrevocable death stage should be recognized to have the right and his/her intention to exercise the right can be inferred from the past records such as expression of the intention to family members, his/her religion, life style, side effect of the treatment, etc. However, as long as the right is regarded as a constitutional fundamental right, the right should be that of all citizens like any other fundamental rights, not just that of a patient who reaches the irrevocable death stage. Next, the Court, while explaining how to exercise the right, characterized the right as a right to shorten the patient's life and therefore many scholars deem the decision to recognize the right to die, the death with dignity, and/or the involuntary (passive) euthanasia. However, the author argues that the decision specifically states the right as a right to refuse(discontinue) treatment and it should not be regarded as a right to die, right of death with dignity and/or any forms of euthanasia. If the Court inadvertently used the word 'right to shorten the patient's life', they should make it clear that the right has nothing to do with the right to die, etc. because the constitutional right to life does not include the right to give up his/her life, i.e., the right to die. The author fully sympathizes with the reasons behind the death with dignity argument, there should be no right of death with dignity since there is no constitutional right to die. Instead, it is enough to say that all citizens have the right to pursue the human dignity and worth, as the Court itself states in the decision.