During the last five years, it has been extremely challenging for KEDO to launch the light water reactor (LWR) project from scratch due to the unfavorable and often hostile political and physical environment in the DPRK. While overcoming the halfcentury lapse of dialogue with the DPRK and mobilizing political and financial support for the project from its members, KEDO has managed to conclude with the DPRK the LWR Supply Agreement in 1995 and subsequent protocols; it also concluded the Turnkey contract with its prime contractor, the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), and completed financial arrangements for the LWR project in early 2000. The fact that the LWR project is now well under way, however, does not guarantee that the smooth implementation to the end. Many uncertainties resulting from the unique nature of the DPRK and this project still lurk at every stage of the projects implementation. Therefore, the pace of the project is subject to how quickly these uncertainties are reduced. Four different imminent and potential obstacles to the project are defined and analyzed in this paper: the DPRK’s cooperation with the project, non-proliferation obligations, readiness to receive the LWR plants, and support from KEDO executive board members. An analysis of these obstacles shows that the pace of the LWR project will ultimately be determined by the DPRK’s political credit, international openness and economic capability. This paper will attempt to help us not only understand the political characteristics of the project but also better prepare for any future contingencies. Some of these are serious matters with political, security and legal implications, while others are financial and technical ones. None of these should be taken lightly, however, since any of them has potential to disrupt the smooth implementation of the project. On the other hand, it is also true that none of these obstacles is insurmountable as long as each concerned party feels that its best interests are being served by abiding by the basic principles prescribed in the 1994 Agreed Framework.

During the last five years, it has been extremely challenging for KEDO to launch the light water reactor (LWR) project from scratch due to the unfavorable and often hostile political and physical environment in the DPRK. While overcoming the halfcentury lapse of dialogue with the DPRK and mobilizing political and financial support for the project from its members, KEDO has managed to conclude with the DPRK the LWR Supply Agreement in 1995 and subsequent protocols; it also concluded the Turnkey contract with its prime contractor, the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), and completed financial arrangements for the LWR project in early 2000. The fact that the LWR project is now well under way, however, does not guarantee that the smooth implementation to the end. Many uncertainties resulting from the unique nature of the DPRK and this project still lurk at every stage of the projects implementation. Therefore, the pace of the project is subject to how quickly these uncertainties are reduced. Four different imminent and potential obstacles to the project are defined and analyzed in this paper: the DPRK’s cooperation with the project, non-proliferation obligations, readiness to receive the LWR plants, and support from KEDO executive board members. An analysis of these obstacles shows that the pace of the LWR project will ultimately be determined by the DPRK’s political credit, international openness and economic capability. This paper will attempt to help us not only understand the political characteristics of the project but also better prepare for any future contingencies. Some of these are serious matters with political, security and legal implications, while others are financial and technical ones. None of these should be taken lightly, however, since any of them has potential to disrupt the smooth implementation of the project. On the other hand, it is also true that none of these obstacles is insurmountable as long as each concerned party feels that its best interests are being served by abiding by the basic principles prescribed in the 1994 Agreed Framework.