지금까지 회사지배구조 논쟁에서 지배주주가 존재하는 회사지배구조에 대해서는 큰 관심이 없어 왔다. 마치 소유가 분산된 영미식의 회사지배구조가 선진적인 법과 시장을 반영한 형태라고 보고 있었던 것이다. 따라서 지배주주가 존재하는 회사지배구조는 종종 차선책의 구조로 간주되어 왔다. 그러나 주식의 소유가 분산된 경우와 집중된 경우에 대한 비교분석은 각각의 구조에 대해 서로 다른 잠재성과 위험이 존재함을 보이고 있다. 양 소유구조가 나름 데로의 장단점이 있을 뿐이다. 지배주주가 존재함으로써 “지배의 사적이익추구”가 발생할 위험이 존재하지만 반면 이러한 지배주주가 존재함으로써 “모든 주주들이 공동으로 누릴 수 있는 혜택” 또한 존재한다. 따라서 회사지배구조 정책에 있어 법과 정부의 역할은 하나의 이상적인 회사지배구조를 추구하는 것이 아니라 다양한 소유구조의 형태사이에서 열린 경쟁이 왜곡 없이 발생할 수 있도록 하는 규제적 틀을 고안하는 것이다.

For a long time, the corporate governance discussion took little note of the particular situation of controlled companies. The underlying assumption often was that the dispersed shareholder structures in the United States and the United Kingdom are a reflection of more advanced laws and markets. As a result, controlling shareholder structures were often explicitly or implicitly portrayed as second best. However, the comparison of controlled with dispersed ownership structures shows different potentials and risks. Both ownership structures have their own comparative advantages and disadvantage. The potential "shared benefits of control" associated with controlling shareholders and the risks of these shareholders reaping "private benefits of control" or entrenching themselves are two sides of the same coin. Hence, selection should be left to the markets as arbitrators. Therefore, The Roles of the Law and the State in Corporate Governance is to devise regulatory frameworks within which the open competition between different forms of ownership structures can take place without distortions not to force to one size

For a long time, the corporate governance discussion took little note of the particular situation of controlled companies. The underlying assumption often was that the dispersed shareholder structures in the United States and the United Kingdom are a reflection of more advanced laws and markets. As a result, controlling shareholder structures were often explicitly or implicitly portrayed as second best. However, the comparison of controlled with dispersed ownership structures shows different potentials and risks. Both ownership structures have their own comparative advantages and disadvantage. The potential "shared benefits of control" associated with controlling shareholders and the risks of these shareholders reaping "private benefits of control" or entrenching themselves are two sides of the same coin. Hence, selection should be left to the markets as arbitrators. Therefore, The Roles of the Law and the State in Corporate Governance is to devise regulatory frameworks within which the open competition between different forms of ownership structures can take place without distortions not to force to one size

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Law and Economics, Cashflow Rights, Voting Rights, Corporate governance, One Share One Vote, Controlling shareholder, Shared benefits of control, Private benefits of control