마치 벌집 들쑤셔 놓은 듯이 논란을 벌였던 것이 언제였나 싶을 정도로 신 영철 대법관의 이른바 ‘촛불재판’ 관여의혹 사건은 이미 과거지사가 되어버린 느낌이다. 하지만 오히려 냄비가 어느 정도 식은 지금이 바로 법관의 독립성과 중립성, 그리고 법관의 양심에 대하여 냉철하게 정리해볼 수 있는 적기라고 믿는 입장에서 우리 헌법 제103조에 대한 평석을 통해 이 사태의 본질과 의미를 적확하게 파악할 수 있는 맥락과 단서를 제시한다. 우리 헌법 제 103조는 법관의 독립성에 대하여 다음과 같이 규정하고 있다: 법관은 헌법과 법률에 의하여 그 양심에 따라 독립하여 심판한다. 본 논문은 우선 헌법국가에서, 법관의 독립성의 의미, 특히 ‘공화주의’와 법관에게 적용되는 고도의 엄격한 공직윤리의 내용과 그 이유를 헌법이론적 맥락과 연결하여 정리한다. 이 를 토대로 하여 법관의 독립성과 양심이 왜, 어떤 맥락에서 중요하고 또 그 구체적인 내용이 무엇인지를 짚어본다. 첫째로 ‘헌법과 법률에 의해서 심판하라’는 ‘준거특정’ 또는 ‘준거제한’의 조건과 관련하여 법텍스트 자체가 원천적으로 확정적이지 못하다는 점과 이 불확정성의 의미와 효용을 해명한다. 이에 따라 법 자체가 적어도 완전히 객관적이지 못한 상태로 주어진다는 점을 재확인한다. 둘째로 이러한 불확정 또는 저확정적인 법텍스트를 해석하는 작업의 본질과 특성을 알아보면서, 특히 해석주체의 인격 중에 무엇인가가 인입될 수밖에 없는, 이른바 ‘구체적인 자기반성’과 ‘전유’의 과정을 전제로 하는 '법해석학적'(hermeneutic) 이해가 법텍스트작업에 그대로 적용될 수 있음을 제시한다. 셋째로 결국 이 두 가지 해명과 정리에 따르면, 법텍스트와 사태 간의 교차적인 영향관계 속에서 해석주체의 적극적인 매개와 개입을 통해 진행되는 법텍스트작업은 일종의 수행이나 실천의 행위로 이해된다. 이는 바로 법관의 독립성이 헌법국가에서 얼마나 중요한 의미를 가지는지, 그 이유가 무엇인지, 그리고 결국 문제의 핵심은 헌법명제로서 법관의 양심으로 귀착됨을 잘 보여주는 바, 법관의 양심의 의의와 성격 및 그 내용을 정리한다. 우선, 법관 개개인의 주관성에서 자유로울 수 없는 법해석작업 속에서 기대하고 요구할 수 있는 것은 법관의 주관적인 인격과 양심밖에 없게 되는 결과가 불가피하다는 점을 확인한다. 이러한 전제 하에 법관의 양심을 ‘양심에 대한 양심’을 내용으로 하는 헌법규범적 지침으로 이해하면서, 겸손과 용기 등의 내면적인 덕목, 헌법과 법률의존성 및 지적 책임과 자기갱신의 노력의무 등을 그 구체적인 내용을 짚어본다. 마지막으로, 앞에서 논의 한 것을 토대로 하여 신 대법관 사태와 관련하여 우리 헌법 제103조에서 어떤 뜻을 찾아서 살려나가야 하는지를 짚어본다.

The main purpose of this essay is to clarify the normative meaning of the independence and conscience of judge, especially in the context of the Art. 103 of the Korean Constitution which write: Judges shall rule independently according to their conscience and in conformity with the Constitution and laws” It is common usage to say that the work of judge is interpreting the law which, according to the traditional theory of legal positivism, would be divided in three dimensions; interpreting in the narrow sense of linguistic analysis, grasping case, and applying interpreted law to the case. But the critical weakness of the so-called three stages-theory of deduction is the tenuousness of the notion of interpreting. This tenuousness reaches the breaking point if one is persuaded of the hermeneutic thesis: the indeterminacy or underdeterminacy of text of law, the incompleteness or non-objectivity of law, and the inevitable partiality of judge and so on. Meanwhile, reason as public value, argument, and justification are not incompatible with uncertainty and indeterminacy of text of law. The indeterminacy of text of law is not to be viewed as the drawback of the idea, principle and system of 'rule of law', at least not as critical, but could be understood as a forum for legal reasoning, argument, and critique. Law is intrinsically not for determinate conclusions. In this sense we may agree on that judge is not interpreting the law but inventing new law. But it is to easy to adopt the notion of the good faith law without asking difficult questions about the plausibility of impartiality of judges who incorporate necessarily their ethic and personal character into their role as intermediaries between the legal text and the event, by and through which they produce legal norm as so called real law; Do we have to take what judges say for granted? How judge can be impartial? Why we are so afraid to believe that judges are human, fallible and malleable? And it is also easy to say that judges are in no way like God rather than ask how we can, despite and just because of the natural limits including institutional constraints, facilitate the progress of the independence and conscience of judge as a human being. Legal reason is still secure for the law and judiciary system. It is needless to say that judges are morally accountable for their work at the same time as they balance their legal duty to the public value with their self-interest. The work of judge necessitate a moral stance. What makes them different is not their superior moral capacity, as they have traditionally claimed. Rather, it is their work which is proceeded in the form and under the rule of legal argument game. By the way, the notions of impartial judge and perfect objectiveness of law seem to be a kind of dilemma. But the values of this deliberation lie in questioning itself, in recognizing the depths of this notion which seems to be some paradoxical, and in not avoiding difficult issues about which there is no clear answer, just because there are assignments we have to cope with. We can find out this message from the Art. 103 of the Constitution of Korea.

The main purpose of this essay is to clarify the normative meaning of the independence and conscience of judge, especially in the context of the Art. 103 of the Korean Constitution which write: Judges shall rule independently according to their conscience and in conformity with the Constitution and laws” It is common usage to say that the work of judge is interpreting the law which, according to the traditional theory of legal positivism, would be divided in three dimensions; interpreting in the narrow sense of linguistic analysis, grasping case, and applying interpreted law to the case. But the critical weakness of the so-called three stages-theory of deduction is the tenuousness of the notion of interpreting. This tenuousness reaches the breaking point if one is persuaded of the hermeneutic thesis: the indeterminacy or underdeterminacy of text of law, the incompleteness or non-objectivity of law, and the inevitable partiality of judge and so on. Meanwhile, reason as public value, argument, and justification are not incompatible with uncertainty and indeterminacy of text of law. The indeterminacy of text of law is not to be viewed as the drawback of the idea, principle and system of 'rule of law', at least not as critical, but could be understood as a forum for legal reasoning, argument, and critique. Law is intrinsically not for determinate conclusions. In this sense we may agree on that judge is not interpreting the law but inventing new law. But it is to easy to adopt the notion of the good faith law without asking difficult questions about the plausibility of impartiality of judges who incorporate necessarily their ethic and personal character into their role as intermediaries between the legal text and the event, by and through which they produce legal norm as so called real law; Do we have to take what judges say for granted? How judge can be impartial? Why we are so afraid to believe that judges are human, fallible and malleable? And it is also easy to say that judges are in no way like God rather than ask how we can, despite and just because of the natural limits including institutional constraints, facilitate the progress of the independence and conscience of judge as a human being. Legal reason is still secure for the law and judiciary system. It is needless to say that judges are morally accountable for their work at the same time as they balance their legal duty to the public value with their self-interest. The work of judge necessitate a moral stance. What makes them different is not their superior moral capacity, as they have traditionally claimed. Rather, it is their work which is proceeded in the form and under the rule of legal argument game. By the way, the notions of impartial judge and perfect objectiveness of law seem to be a kind of dilemma. But the values of this deliberation lie in questioning itself, in recognizing the depths of this notion which seems to be some paradoxical, and in not avoiding difficult issues about which there is no clear answer, just because there are assignments we have to cope with. We can find out this message from the Art. 103 of the Constitution of Korea.

Art. 103 of the Constitution of Korea, independence of judge, conscience of judge, ethic of public service, text of law