모자관계가 연속하는 경우 모회사 주주가 자회사, 손자회사 또는 증손회사 등의 이사를 상대로 제기하는 대표소송을 다중대표소송이라고 한다. 대법원은 모회사 주주는 원고적격이 없다는 이유로 이중대표소송을 각하하였지만, 다중대표소송의 입법화와 관련하여 다양한 주장이 제기되고 있다. 본 논문에서는 이러한 주장에 대하여 소개하고 다음과 같은 입장을 제시하고 있다. 자회사 대표이사가 자회사 재산을 횡령하였음에도 불구하고 모회사와 자회사 모두 자회사 대표이사의 책임을 추궁하지 않는 경우가 있다. 모회사 소수주주는 모회사 대표이사를 상대로 모회사가 당한 손해를 배상하라는 대표소송을 제기할 수 있다. 그러나 모회사 대표이사에게 배상할 자력이 없거나 모회사의 손해를 평가하기 어려운 경우 모회사 소수주주가 자회사 대표이사를 상대로 이중대표소송을 제기하는 것을 인정할 필요가 있다. 유사한 논리를 적용한다면 삼중대표소송과 사중대표소송 등을 인정할 필요가 있다. 본 논문에서는 모자관계가 연속하는 경우 다중대표소송을 인정하는 사례에 대하여 검토한 후 입법론을 제기하고 있다. 누가 다중대표소송을 제기할 수 있느냐는 문제가 제기된다. 단독주주가 제기할 수 있나? 발행주식총수의 100분의 1 이상을 소유한 소수주주(상법403조)가 제기할 수 있나? 제소주주의 경제적 이익 보호라는 측면에서 다중대표소송을 인정한다면 모회사 소수주주에게 제소권을 인정하는 것이 타당하다. 어느 정도 범위에서 다중대표소송을 인정할 것이냐는 문제가 제기된다. 이중대표소송만 인정할 것인가? 모자관계가 연속하는 한 인정할 것이냐? 다중대표소송을 제기한 주주의 지분율이 동일하고 승소시 자회사나 손자회사가 얻게 되는 금액이 동일하다면, 삼중대표소송에 승소한 모회사 주주가 얻게 되는 경제적 이익은 이중대표소송에 승소한 경우에 얻게 되는 경제적 이익의 2분의 1을 초과하게 될 것이다. 따라서 다중대표소송에서 승소한 경우 손해를 배상받는 회사가 자회사이냐 손자회사이냐 아니면 증손회사이냐에 따라 주주가 얻게 되는 경제적 이익의 차이가 매우 큰 것은 아니라고 할 수 있다. 그러므로 모자관계가 연속하는 경우 손해를 배상받는 회사가 자회사이냐 손자회사이냐 아니면 증손회사이냐와는 무관하게 다중대표소송을 제기할 수 있다고 보는 것이 타당하다.

A multiple derivative suit is a representative lawsuit brought by a shareholder, not against the company that issued the stocks he owns, but against the members of board of directors of a subsidiary company or a sub-subsidiary, sub-sub-subsidiary, etc. The Korean Supreme Court dismissed the double derivative suit of the plaintiff on the grounds that the shareholder of the controlling company lacks standing to sue, but various arguments have been put forth on legalization of double derivative suits. There are cases where both the parent and the subsidiary companies do not hold the representative director of the subsidiary company to account despite his embezzling of subsidiary company assets. The minority shareholders of the parent company can file a representative suit against the representative director of the parent company for damages suffered by the parent company. However, when the representative director of the parent company does not have resources to pay for damages, or when it is difficult to assess damages suffered by the parent company, it is necessary to allow a double derivative suit by the minority shareholders of the parent company against the representative director of the subsidiary company. Applying a similar logic, it necessary to recognize a triple derivative suit as well as a quadruple derivative suit, etc. In this paper, we propose a concrete legislative theory, after reviewing the cases where a multiple derivative suit is recognized for a consecutive parent-subsidiary relationship. There is a question of who is allowed to file a multiple derivative suit. Can a sole shareholder bring suit? Can minority shareholders who own more than one-hundredth of the total number of issued shares (Article 403 of the Commercial Law) bring suit? If we allow a multiple derivative suit on account of protecting economic interests of the suing shareholders, it is reasonable to recognize the standing to sue of minority shareholders of the parent company. There is a problem as to what extent the multiple derivative suit should be recognized. Should only single derivative suits be recognized? Should triple derivative suits also be recognized? Should quadruple derivative suits be? Are we to recognize them as long as there is a chain of parent-subsidiary relationship? For example, if the percentages of ownership of the shareholders who brought the multiple derivative suit are equal, and the amounts that the subsidiary or sub-subsidiary company will gain after winning the case are equal, the financial profit gained by the shareholders of the parent company for winning a triple derivative suit exceeds one half of the financial profit gained for winning a double derivative suit. Thus, it can be said that there is not much difference in the financial profit gained by the shareholders whether it is the subsidiary, the sub-subsidiary, or the sub-sub-subsidiary who receives compensation for damages by winning a multiple derivative suit. Hence, with consecutive parent-subsidiary relationships, it is reasonable allow bringing multiple derivative suits, regardless of whether it is the subsidiary, the sub-subsidiary, or the sub-sub-subsidiary who receives compensation for damages.

A multiple derivative suit is a representative lawsuit brought by a shareholder, not against the company that issued the stocks he owns, but against the members of board of directors of a subsidiary company or a sub-subsidiary, sub-sub-subsidiary, etc. The Korean Supreme Court dismissed the double derivative suit of the plaintiff on the grounds that the shareholder of the controlling company lacks standing to sue, but various arguments have been put forth on legalization of double derivative suits. There are cases where both the parent and the subsidiary companies do not hold the representative director of the subsidiary company to account despite his embezzling of subsidiary company assets. The minority shareholders of the parent company can file a representative suit against the representative director of the parent company for damages suffered by the parent company. However, when the representative director of the parent company does not have resources to pay for damages, or when it is difficult to assess damages suffered by the parent company, it is necessary to allow a double derivative suit by the minority shareholders of the parent company against the representative director of the subsidiary company. Applying a similar logic, it necessary to recognize a triple derivative suit as well as a quadruple derivative suit, etc. In this paper, we propose a concrete legislative theory, after reviewing the cases where a multiple derivative suit is recognized for a consecutive parent-subsidiary relationship. There is a question of who is allowed to file a multiple derivative suit. Can a sole shareholder bring suit? Can minority shareholders who own more than one-hundredth of the total number of issued shares (Article 403 of the Commercial Law) bring suit? If we allow a multiple derivative suit on account of protecting economic interests of the suing shareholders, it is reasonable to recognize the standing to sue of minority shareholders of the parent company. There is a problem as to what extent the multiple derivative suit should be recognized. Should only single derivative suits be recognized? Should triple derivative suits also be recognized? Should quadruple derivative suits be? Are we to recognize them as long as there is a chain of parent-subsidiary relationship? For example, if the percentages of ownership of the shareholders who brought the multiple derivative suit are equal, and the amounts that the subsidiary or sub-subsidiary company will gain after winning the case are equal, the financial profit gained by the shareholders of the parent company for winning a triple derivative suit exceeds one half of the financial profit gained for winning a double derivative suit. Thus, it can be said that there is not much difference in the financial profit gained by the shareholders whether it is the subsidiary, the sub-subsidiary, or the sub-sub-subsidiary who receives compensation for damages by winning a multiple derivative suit. Hence, with consecutive parent-subsidiary relationships, it is reasonable allow bringing multiple derivative suits, regardless of whether it is the subsidiary, the sub-subsidiary, or the sub-sub-subsidiary who receives compensation for damages.

Extent of recognizing multiple derivative suits, Minority shareholder's right, Necessity of multiple derivative suits, Quadruple derivative suit, Triple derivative suit