In the late 1980s a movement towards privatization swept through Western Europe, affecting many industries. The government role in the process was to protect national interests and preserve national independence. In an effort to do so, governments often retained some power and influence with regard to the newly privatized company. Golden shares were first used in the United Kingdom during privatization in the 1980s for companies in which the government wanted to maintain some influence. Many nations privatized important industries but reluctant to give up all control, implemented restrictive measures which allowed varying degrees of governmental control over the privatized company. A golden share vests special rights in the government vis-à-vis the privatized company. These control rights take many forms, and are often granted through the conversion of a regular share into a special share to which these special control rights attach. Alternatively, ministerial veto power can substitute for an actual share, or can be a supplement power along with the special share. The most common control rights, and those which have come under attack by the European Commission, are: ⑴ the right to restrict the acquisition of shares; ⑵ the right to appoint directors to the board; ⑶ the right to veto certain critical company decisions; and ⑷ the right to limit the number of foreign directors on the board of the company. This article reviews the characteristics and history of the golden share at first. It also analyzes golden share cases and laws of the European Court, the United States and Japan. Especially, it shows how golden share cases of the European Court have developed. This article discusses legal problems associated in introducing golden share system into Korea. It reviews the necessity of the introduction of the golden share into Korea, the method to adjust conflict of interests among shareholders, the relevance of one share one vote principles, and some legal issues with respect to listing golden shares on stock markets. Finally, it discusses the 2006 Revision to Korean Commercial Code and suggests to adopt golden shares for closed corporations.

In the late 1980s a movement towards privatization swept through Western Europe, affecting many industries. The government role in the process was to protect national interests and preserve national independence. In an effort to do so, governments often retained some power and influence with regard to the newly privatized company. Golden shares were first used in the United Kingdom during privatization in the 1980s for companies in which the government wanted to maintain some influence. Many nations privatized important industries but reluctant to give up all control, implemented restrictive measures which allowed varying degrees of governmental control over the privatized company. A golden share vests special rights in the government vis-à-vis the privatized company. These control rights take many forms, and are often granted through the conversion of a regular share into a special share to which these special control rights attach. Alternatively, ministerial veto power can substitute for an actual share, or can be a supplement power along with the special share. The most common control rights, and those which have come under attack by the European Commission, are: ⑴ the right to restrict the acquisition of shares; ⑵ the right to appoint directors to the board; ⑶ the right to veto certain critical company decisions; and ⑷ the right to limit the number of foreign directors on the board of the company. This article reviews the characteristics and history of the golden share at first. It also analyzes golden share cases and laws of the European Court, the United States and Japan. Especially, it shows how golden share cases of the European Court have developed. This article discusses legal problems associated in introducing golden share system into Korea. It reviews the necessity of the introduction of the golden share into Korea, the method to adjust conflict of interests among shareholders, the relevance of one share one vote principles, and some legal issues with respect to listing golden shares on stock markets. Finally, it discusses the 2006 Revision to Korean Commercial Code and suggests to adopt golden shares for closed corporations.

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Golden Shares, Stock of Veto, Class Stock of Veto, Stock for Classified Board of Director, Class Voting Stock for Classified Board of Directors, Class Stock, Dual Common Stock, Disparate Common Stock