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There has been a lot of empirical studies on the deterrent effect of punishment. In general, these studies have shown inconsistent findings. This suggests that deterrence theory's basic explanatory frame have some flaws. First of all, the assumption of rational choice is problematic especially when it is applied to the explanatory model for criminal behaviors. And deterrence theory, at least in its basic version, does not properly consider the effectiveness of informal social sanctions. Most importantly, this theory needs to take into account the role of decision-makers' characteristics in the calculation of perceived outcomes of their criminal behaviors. Those characteristics might determine the sizes of weights which definitely affect his or her evaluation of costs and benefits from a specific criminal behavior. And criminological theories provide useful information on those characteristics. Therefore, it is necessary to have more elaborated deterrence models which take into account the factors from other criminological theories to examine the effect of punishment properly. In addition, we need to remember the fact that only a part of population tends to engage in the rational calculation regarding the outcomes of their criminal behaviors. Most people do not feel the need for that calculation because they have internalized norms. And the size of the group who would be willing to calculate the outcomes of their criminal behaviors might vary with different natures of crimes. In addition, other important issues on the effect of punishment are discussed.


There has been a lot of empirical studies on the deterrent effect of punishment. In general, these studies have shown inconsistent findings. This suggests that deterrence theory's basic explanatory frame have some flaws. First of all, the assumption of rational choice is problematic especially when it is applied to the explanatory model for criminal behaviors. And deterrence theory, at least in its basic version, does not properly consider the effectiveness of informal social sanctions. Most importantly, this theory needs to take into account the role of decision-makers' characteristics in the calculation of perceived outcomes of their criminal behaviors. Those characteristics might determine the sizes of weights which definitely affect his or her evaluation of costs and benefits from a specific criminal behavior. And criminological theories provide useful information on those characteristics. Therefore, it is necessary to have more elaborated deterrence models which take into account the factors from other criminological theories to examine the effect of punishment properly. In addition, we need to remember the fact that only a part of population tends to engage in the rational calculation regarding the outcomes of their criminal behaviors. Most people do not feel the need for that calculation because they have internalized norms. And the size of the group who would be willing to calculate the outcomes of their criminal behaviors might vary with different natures of crimes. In addition, other important issues on the effect of punishment are discussed.