The concept of multiple voting shares is not allowed under the Korean Commercial Code(KCC). Although the amendment bill of KCC is considering allowance of non-voting common shares, the multiple voting shares or priority shares are not permitted under the amendment bill. This paper analyzed whether multiple voting shares should be allowed under the current corporate governance environment in Korea. In the United States, a company is able to issue multiple voting right shares without any limitation under most of state corporate laws, but the dual class recapitalization by listed companies is prohibited by listing rules. Many European countries allow multiple voting share system, even though pyramidal share ownership is prevalent among European companies. In Korea, controlling shareholders have disproportionately higher control right compared to their cash flow right through pyramidal and circular share ownership and the private benefit of control seems to be larger than U.S. or European Companies. Under this corporate governance settings, the agency cost of additional control enhancing mechanism like multiple voting shares might be likely to exceed its benefit. Under this analysis, it may not be desirable to allow multiple voting shares in the listed companies where pyramidal and circular share ownership is prevalent.

The concept of multiple voting shares is not allowed under the Korean Commercial Code(KCC). Although the amendment bill of KCC is considering allowance of non-voting common shares, the multiple voting shares or priority shares are not permitted under the amendment bill. This paper analyzed whether multiple voting shares should be allowed under the current corporate governance environment in Korea. In the United States, a company is able to issue multiple voting right shares without any limitation under most of state corporate laws, but the dual class recapitalization by listed companies is prohibited by listing rules. Many European countries allow multiple voting share system, even though pyramidal share ownership is prevalent among European companies. In Korea, controlling shareholders have disproportionately higher control right compared to their cash flow right through pyramidal and circular share ownership and the private benefit of control seems to be larger than U.S. or European Companies. Under this corporate governance settings, the agency cost of additional control enhancing mechanism like multiple voting shares might be likely to exceed its benefit. Under this analysis, it may not be desirable to allow multiple voting shares in the listed companies where pyramidal and circular share ownership is prevalent.

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dual-class recapitalization. multiple voting shares, one share one vote, conrtrolling minority shareholders, control enhancing mechanism, pyramid structure