초록 열기/닫기 버튼
This year's merger between Samsung C&T Corporation (hereinafter CT) and Cheil Industries Inc. (hereinafter Cheil) incurred strong oppositions by Elliot Associate L.P. (hereinafter Elliot); Elliot exercised its minority shareholder rights insisting that this merger went contrary to the interests of both CT and its shareholders. However, a series of countermeasures taken in the pursuit of the merger by CT's management against Elliot could be evaluated insufficient in a third person perspective. In an important transaction of a company, the desirable standard is whether that transaction contributes to the long term benefits of that company. This decision is not up to a controlling shareholder/the board of directors but to the shareholders' meeting on the condition that precise/enough information is provided to all shareholders. In this point, the merger process and the CT's reaction against the other shareholders including Elliot considerably fell short of the desirable level. Generally in a situation where there might be big interest conflicts with other shareholders, the party should open this situation and suggest conflict mitigating plan. Majority of Korean large listed companies have their controlling shareholders so there always exist the possibilities of interest conflicts between controlling shareholder and the company/minority shareholders. For example, controlling shareholders can abuse their power in determining merger ratio and/or disposal of company's own shares in favor of his/her benefit, harming the interests of both the company and other shareholders. Therefore, the standard of judicial review in Korea should also reflect the situation of large listed companies – majority of them have controlling shareholders; the judicial review can consider accepting entire fairness standard of interested director/controlling shareholder from Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Usually, the takeover defense by a company is directly connected to interest conflicts for the benefit of managements/controlling shareholders so enough devices against abusing their defenses must go in a dispute situation; it is not sufficient in interest conflicts situation to tell that managements/controlling shareholders obey the current legal requirements for each act. Ultimately, introduction of controlling shareholders’ fiduciary duty in Korean law will be the fundamental solution for the pursuit of interests of a company/total shareholders with lowest social cost as it will filter in advance activities which may have concerns of interest conflicts.
키워드열기/닫기 버튼
takeover defense, interest conflict, disposal of company’s own shares, transactions between a major shareholder and company, fiduciary duty of controlling shareholder, judicial review standard
