자유의지에 대한 철학자들의 관심과 뇌과학자들의 관심이 같을 수는 없다. 이들이 각각 동원할 수 있는 개념적 자원이나 설명 수단이 다를 수밖에 없는데도 불구하고 이것들이 뒤엉키게 된다면 혼란과 불필요한 마찰이 생기기 마련이다. 리벳(Libet) 실험 이후 철학자들과 과학자들이 벌이는 자유의지 논쟁에는 이런 뒤엉킴으로 인한 혼란이 엿보인다. 어느 진영이든 지적 과장 유혹을 경계한다면, 자유의지 논의와 뇌과학 연구는 상대 진영을 서로 대척점으로써만 바라보는 대신, 인간의 자유와 인간행위에 대한 더 나은 학문적 토대와 이론 개발을 위한 협업과 새로운 분업관계에 들어설 수 있을 것이다. 이 글은 학문적 이상으로서의 이런 협업을 지향하면서 ‘자유의지 vs. 결정론’으로 거론되는 철학적 논의지형을 재검토해 본다. 이와 함께 일반사람들이 이론적 추상적 맥락에서는 자유의지와 결정론이 양립할 수 없다는 태도를 취하지만 실제 구체적 맥락 속에서는 다른 태도를 보인다는 점에 주목한다. 그리고 자연과학에도 깊은 관심을 가졌던 칸트가 자유를 학문 안으로 끌어들이는 모험을 하면서 보인 조심성이 우리의 주제와 관련하여 의미 있는 시사를 한다는 점을 지적하고자 한다. 그리고 자유의지 논의에서 통상 개념필연적 요소로 지목되는 ‘달리 행동할 수 있었음’에 대해 새로운 평가가능성을 검토해 보고, 리벳 실험을 예로 들어 자유의지에 대한 뇌과학적 접근의 문제점을 살펴본다. 마지막으로 규범적 지식 획득 과정에서 환원주의(reductionism), 제거주의(eliminativism), 부수주의(epiphenomenalism)의 위험성을 지적하고, 자유의지와 뇌과학의 ‘상호 인정 투쟁’ 속에서 철학과 과학의 협업공간을 넓힐 수 있음을 지적하고자 한다.

It is only natural that perspectives on free will differ between philosophers and brain scientists. The conceptual resources and explanation methods able to by conjured up by the two camps can only but differ, and therefore if they were to get entangled this would only render chaos and unnecessary conflict. After the Libet Experiment, philosophers and scientists underwent this kind of confusion when discussing free will due to this conceptual convolvement. If the two camps are able to be vigilant of temptations of intellectual exaggeration, the discussion of free will and brain science research can stop looking at the other camp as an antipode and make progress in finding collaboration and forming a new division of labor for building a better academic foundation and developing theory. This paper aims toward collaboration as an academic ideal and re-examines the argumentative topography for philosophy’s debate between “free will vs. determinism”. This paper focuses especially on the fact that most people assume the stance that free will and determinism are incompatible from the abstract theoretical sense, but in fact assume a difference stance altogether in the actual context. Also this paper points out that Kant, who had deep interest in natural science, showed a great deal of carefulness when taking the risk of incorporating the concept of freedom into scientific thoughts. His carefulness makes a meaningful point which has a great deal to do with the subject we attempt to discuss in this paper. This paper also looks at the possible evaluations of the inevitable notion of the free will discussion, that of “could have done otherwise”, and taking the Libet Experiment as an example scrutinize the problems of brain science’s approach on free will. Finally this paper points out the dangers of reductionism, eliminativism, epiphenomenalism in the process of collecting normative knowledge, and in the ‘struggle for mutual recognition’ between free will and brain science, we can attempt to expand the area of collaboration between philosophy and science.

It is only natural that perspectives on free will differ between philosophers and brain scientists. The conceptual resources and explanation methods able to by conjured up by the two camps can only but differ, and therefore if they were to get entangled this would only render chaos and unnecessary conflict. After the Libet Experiment, philosophers and scientists underwent this kind of confusion when discussing free will due to this conceptual convolvement. If the two camps are able to be vigilant of temptations of intellectual exaggeration, the discussion of free will and brain science research can stop looking at the other camp as an antipode and make progress in finding collaboration and forming a new division of labor for building a better academic foundation and developing theory. This paper aims toward collaboration as an academic ideal and re-examines the argumentative topography for philosophy’s debate between “free will vs. determinism”. This paper focuses especially on the fact that most people assume the stance that free will and determinism are incompatible from the abstract theoretical sense, but in fact assume a difference stance altogether in the actual context. Also this paper points out that Kant, who had deep interest in natural science, showed a great deal of carefulness when taking the risk of incorporating the concept of freedom into scientific thoughts. His carefulness makes a meaningful point which has a great deal to do with the subject we attempt to discuss in this paper. This paper also looks at the possible evaluations of the inevitable notion of the free will discussion, that of “could have done otherwise”, and taking the Libet Experiment as an example scrutinize the problems of brain science’s approach on free will. Finally this paper points out the dangers of reductionism, eliminativism, epiphenomenalism in the process of collecting normative knowledge, and in the ‘struggle for mutual recognition’ between free will and brain science, we can attempt to expand the area of collaboration between philosophy and science.

free will, brain science, determinism, Libet Experiment, Kant, normative knowledge