비공식 부문이 큰 개발도상국 경제에서 실업자소득보존제도 적용율을 제고하기 위한 접근법허재준개도국에서는 제도적 요인으로 인해 조세 및 사회보험 적용률이 낮은 경향이 있다. 이로 인해 새로 소득보전프로그램을 도입할 때에는 감독이나 조세율보다 어떤 제도를 채택하느냐가 더 중요하다. 보다 많은 사람을 실업자 소득보전프로그램에 포착하기 위해서는 스스로의 유인에 의해 적용률이 높을 제도를 채택하는 것이 중요하다. 개별가입자의 적용률 제고 유인이 높은 제도는 퇴직금 개별구좌(Severance Pay Individual Account)나, 개인별저축구좌(UISA)가 그 예이다.어떤 제도를 도입할 것이냐에서 나아가 하나의 실업자 소득보전프로그램이 이미 존재하고 있는 상태에서의 적용률 제고의 문제를 논하자면, 정부가 그 적용범위를 확대하고, 공식부문에 속하게 되었을 때 부담하게 될 비용(조세 등)을 줄여주고 받을 수 있는 혜택 수준을 늘려주며 감독이나 벌칙 강화를 통해 누락의 기회비용을 높이면 적용률이 올라갈 것이다.이러한 공식부문적 특성 외에도 조세기관과 사회보험기관의 작동방식이나 그곳에서 일하는 직원의 행태를 진단하여 적용률을 제고하기 위한 노력을 하는 것도 중요하다. 일반적으로 기관간 정보교환이나 요원들의 일하는 방식이 효율적으로 작동하고 있지 않은 경우가 있기 때문이다.개도국에서는 집행기관의 요원들의 유인프로그램 도입을 통해 적용률을 제고할 수 있는 여지가 존재한다. 또한 적극적 광고 등을 통해 많은 사람들이 수혜를 받고 있다는 사실과 자신들이 일했던 기록을 잘 관리함으로써 많은 혜택을 받을 수 있다는 사실을 알리는 것도 적용률 제고에 기여한다.

In developing countries, tax and reporting compliance tends to be low for institutional reasons. Therefore, compliance can be dependent more upon program adopted or design of the program than on enforcement and tax rates. To include as many workers as possible in the public income support program against unemployment, therefore choosing or adapting to compliance-friendly program is desirable. A compliance-friendly program is the one where workers have strong interest in monitoring compliance. Severance pay individual account and UISA, with or without solidarity fund, are examples. An income support program being existent, if the government expand the mandatory coverage by eliminating grandfather clause, and lowers explicit costs of formality such as the size of tax wedge and job security provisions, provides larger benefits to compliant workers, and raises cost of non-compliance by strengthening inspection system and raising penalties of non-compliance, the compliance rate will go up. Besides these formal aspects, it is important to diagnose carefully various instances of the existing institution and behavioral aspects of administration officials. Coordination and information problems may exist, signaling the importance of a responsibletask force which investigates tax collecting offices, administration of reporting routine, way of working in front office of the social insurance, and coordinates different units of entities of which the income support system is comprised. In developing countries there existrooms for enhancing compliance by having active recourse to organizational incentive arrangements for stimulating the personnel of social insurance administration. The last, but not the least important thing is to let workers see it pays to be entitled to social insurance via advertisement, sufficient number of recipients, possibility of other benefits when workers prove their employment status, etc.

In developing countries, tax and reporting compliance tends to be low for institutional reasons. Therefore, compliance can be dependent more upon program adopted or design of the program than on enforcement and tax rates. To include as many workers as possible in the public income support program against unemployment, therefore choosing or adapting to compliance-friendly program is desirable. A compliance-friendly program is the one where workers have strong interest in monitoring compliance. Severance pay individual account and UISA, with or without solidarity fund, are examples. An income support program being existent, if the government expand the mandatory coverage by eliminating grandfather clause, and lowers explicit costs of formality such as the size of tax wedge and job security provisions, provides larger benefits to compliant workers, and raises cost of non-compliance by strengthening inspection system and raising penalties of non-compliance, the compliance rate will go up. Besides these formal aspects, it is important to diagnose carefully various instances of the existing institution and behavioral aspects of administration officials. Coordination and information problems may exist, signaling the importance of a responsibletask force which investigates tax collecting offices, administration of reporting routine, way of working in front office of the social insurance, and coordinates different units of entities of which the income support system is comprised. In developing countries there existrooms for enhancing compliance by having active recourse to organizational incentive arrangements for stimulating the personnel of social insurance administration. The last, but not the least important thing is to let workers see it pays to be entitled to social insurance via advertisement, sufficient number of recipients, possibility of other benefits when workers prove their employment status, etc.

income support programs, unemployment, informal sector, compliance