최근 키코(KIKO) 계약보다 고객에게 더욱 큰 위험을 초래하는 스노우볼(Snowball) 계약과 관련하여, 고객과 은행 사이에 다수의 법적 분쟁이 발생하고 있다. 그리고 이들 법적 분쟁을 검토해 보면, 적합성의 원칙과 설명의무와 같은 고객보호의무가 가장 핵심적인 쟁점이 되고 있다. 은행은 고객조사의무를 철저히 한 후 일반투자자에게 투자권유를 할 당시 투자목적⋅재산상황 및 투자경험 등에 비추어 투자자에게 적합하지 아니한 투자권유를 해서는 안된다. 그리고 은행은 상품조사의무를 성실히 이행하여 스노우볼 상품에 대해 명확하게 이해한 후 일반투자자에게 스노우볼 계약에 따른 수익과 위험을 균형 있게 설명하여야 한다. 설명의 주요 내용으로는 일반투자자가 스노우볼 거래에서 향후 직면할 수 있는 손실발생 가능성과 발생범위(행사환율이 언제 하락하고, 얼마까지 하락할 수 있는지 여부)에 대해 매우 구체적인 시나리오를 제시하면서 일반투자자가 이해할 수 있도록 명확하게 설명하여야 한다. 은행은 이러한 설명에 근거하여 이 거래가 마이너스의 시장가치를 갖고 있고 무한대로 손실 가능하다는 점을 일반투자자에게 이해시킨 후 일반투자자가 위험에 대한 수용 여부를 스스로 판단할 수 있도록 하여야 한다. 스노우볼 계약뿐만 아니라 KIKO 계약에서도 동일하게 주장할 수 있는 쟁점으로서, 은행에 부과되는 적합성의 원칙과 설명의무는 단순한 신의칙에서 파생된 것이 아니라는 점을 지적하고 싶다. 2007년 당시 금융감독원의 업무규정인 은행업감독업무 시행세칙 제64조와 제65조는 너무나도 분명하게 그리고 구체적으로 스노우볼, KIKO와 같은 장외파생상품을 판매하는 은행이 제공하여야 할 정보의 내용과 범위를 규정하였다. 이 조항들은 은행으로 하여금 장외파생상품 거래시 거래상대방에게 중요한 정보를 상세히 내역별로 제공하도록 특별히 규정하고 있는데, 이는 바로 고객보호의무를 염두에 둔 것이다. 그리고 동 규정들은 지금도 상위 법령과 은행업감독규정으로 이관되어 효력을 유지하고 있다. 따라서 향후 법원들은 손해배상액 산정 및 책임의 공평한 분배를 함에 있어서 고객의 과실보다는 법규를 위반한 은행의 과실을 더욱 위중하게 취급하여야 할 것이다.

Recently, lots of legal disputes regarding snowball contracts have been increasing between clients and their commercial banks. Snowball contracts are considered more risky than KIKO contracts in the korean financial industry. Considering those disputes, fiduciary duty is the cornerstone of all the issues, including suitability principle based on the know-your-customer rule, the know-your-product rule and the duty to provide product guidelines to bona fide non-professional investors. On September of 2010, the author, as a committee member, participated in a decision by the Sanction Committee of the Financial Supervisory Service against commercial banks which had sold snowball products to their clients. All the banks, their directors and employees had to be subject to severe sanctions due to the snowball products per se which were harmful and fraudulent in essence. Since then, the author has been especially concerned with snowballs and their fatal problems. In the meantime, the Seoul District Court held in one case(2009GaHap90004) that clients were more negligent and liable than banks in that snowball contract. The decision have been seriously questioned by some scholars and lawyers. The author also felt that trial court seemed not to understand the nature of the snowball because it did not pace with the Financial Supervisory Service. Part Ⅱ briefly overviews the character of the snowball product and relevant legal issues. After introducing the fiduciary duty in part Ⅲ, part Ⅳ deals with precedent cases and analyzes the applicability of some case laws and doctrines to this snowball contract. Part Ⅴ considers one Germany case which dealt with an OTC derivative, the structure of which was very similar to the snowball. Part Ⅵ is a conclusion.

Recently, lots of legal disputes regarding snowball contracts have been increasing between clients and their commercial banks. Snowball contracts are considered more risky than KIKO contracts in the korean financial industry. Considering those disputes, fiduciary duty is the cornerstone of all the issues, including suitability principle based on the know-your-customer rule, the know-your-product rule and the duty to provide product guidelines to bona fide non-professional investors. On September of 2010, the author, as a committee member, participated in a decision by the Sanction Committee of the Financial Supervisory Service against commercial banks which had sold snowball products to their clients. All the banks, their directors and employees had to be subject to severe sanctions due to the snowball products per se which were harmful and fraudulent in essence. Since then, the author has been especially concerned with snowballs and their fatal problems. In the meantime, the Seoul District Court held in one case(2009GaHap90004) that clients were more negligent and liable than banks in that snowball contract. The decision have been seriously questioned by some scholars and lawyers. The author also felt that trial court seemed not to understand the nature of the snowball because it did not pace with the Financial Supervisory Service. Part Ⅱ briefly overviews the character of the snowball product and relevant legal issues. After introducing the fiduciary duty in part Ⅲ, part Ⅳ deals with precedent cases and analyzes the applicability of some case laws and doctrines to this snowball contract. Part Ⅴ considers one Germany case which dealt with an OTC derivative, the structure of which was very similar to the snowball. Part Ⅵ is a conclusion.

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snowball, KIKO, fiduciary duty, suitability, duty to inform, sections 64 and 65 under the Enforcement Rule of the Banking Business Regulation, striking price, minus market value