본 논문에서 필자는 좋음의 이데아와 일자는 동일하다는 신플라톤주의의 주장에 반해 플라톤의 『국가』편에서 좋은 것의 이데아와 『파르메니데스』편에서 하나인 것 사이의 관계는 어떤 관계인지를 규명하고자 한다. 좋은 것의 이데아가 다루어지는 『국가』편에서 태양의 비유는 『국가』편에서 처음 나타난 것이 아니라, 플라톤이 어떻게 자신의 이데아론에 도달하였는지를 기술하는 『파이돈』편에서 이미 나타난 것이다. 『파이돈』편에 따르면, 일식 때 태양을 직접 보면 (육체의) 눈이 상하기 때문에 물에 비친 영상을 보듯이, “있는 것들”을 직접 보면 (영혼의) 눈이 상할까봐, “로고스들 안에서” 비추어보아야 한다는 것이고, 그렇게 비추어보아 보인 것이 곧 “이데아”라는 것이다. 이 비유에서 태양과 비유된 것은 “있는” 것이며, 이러한 사실은 『국가』편에서 태양과 비유된 “좋은” 것이 왜 인식과 존재를 가능하게 하면서 존재도 넘어서는 것인지를 이해하게 해준다. 이데아론의 견지에서 볼 때, “있는” 것은 이데아에 의해 규정된 존재를 존재하게 하고 규정하면서도 존재를 넘어서는 것이기 때문에 모든 존재가 추구하여야 할 것으로 “좋은” 것이다. 이런 의미에서 이데아론의 견지에서, “있는” 것은 “좋은” 것의 이데아인 것이다. 반면, 『파르메니데스』편 제1가정에서 하나인 것은, 신플라톤주의자들이 생각하듯 『국가』편 태양의 비유에서 좋은 것의 이데아가 존재를 넘어서듯, 존재를 넘어서며 그런 의미에서 존재하는 것이 아닌 것이 아니라, 처음부터 술어 “하나”가 아니기 때문에 “있지도 않고 하나이지도 않는” 것이다. 『파르메니데스』편에서 하나인 것이 그렇다는 것은 전반부에서의 이데아론 비판으로부터도 분명하며 또한 이행부에서의 제논의 방법으로부터도 분명하다. 말하자면 하나라는 것이 있다는 것이 “하나”라는 술어에 의해 문제적이 되었기 때문에 한편으로는 하나인 것이 “있다”고 전제하며 다른 한편으로는 “있지 않다”고 전제하는 것이다. 그로부터 제1가정에서는 하나인 것을 있다고 가정하면서도 그것이 하나가 아니라는 것에 의해 하나인 것은 있지도 않고 하나이지도 않다는 결론을 도출해 내는 것이다. 그러므로 제1가정에서 하나인 것은 좋은 것의 이데아가 아니며, 오히려 하나인 것이 있는 것과 관계 맺는 것은 제2, 제3가정에서 존재의 선험적 조건인 시간을 매개로 해서이다. 그러나 시간 속에서 하나인 것과 있는 것의 관계는 제3가정에서 “순간”의 문제로 난제에 봉착한다. 하나인 것이 여전히 우리 인간 존재의 지평에서 있는 것과 어떻게 관계 맺는지를 보다 일반적으로 보여주는 것은 있는 것이 무엇인지를 규정하면서 있지 않는 것을 규정하는 『소피스테스』편에서이다. 여기서 플라톤은 있는 것이 무엇인지를 세 가지 방식을 통해 규정한다. 첫째는 “있음이 무엇인가”에 대한 일원론자와 다원론자의 논쟁을 통해서이고, 둘째는 물질론자들과 형상론자들 사이에 “존재를 둘러싼 거인 족과의 싸움”을 통해서이고, 셋째는 “있는 것”, “정지”, “운동”과 같은 “유들 가운데 가장 큰 것들” 사이의 변증법적 관계를 통해서이다. 이와 같은 규정 속에서 플라톤은 단지 있는 것이 무엇인가를 규정할 뿐만이 아니라 동시에 있지 않는 것이 무엇인가를 규정한다. 그러나 결론은, “있지 않는 것”은 있는 것과 대립된 어떤 것이 아니라 단지 상이한 것이며, 있는 것과 있는 것 사이의 대립으로서 그 자신은 존재에 근거하는 “하나의 형상”이라는 것이다. 그로부터 플라톤은 있지 않는 것은 있지 않는 것임으로 하나인 것이 있는 것에 참여하는 데에는 어떠한 것도 방해하지 않을 것이라는 입장인 듯하다.

Divergent from the Neo-Platonic thesis on identity, the author tries with this article to elucidate the relation between the Idea of the Good in the Republic and the One in the Parmenides of Plato. The Comparison with the Sun, which elucidates the Idea of the Good in the Republic, did not firstly appear in the Republic, but had already appeared in the Phaedo, where Plato himself describes how he reached the Theory of Ideas. The Phaedo states that as eyes are hurt when looking at the sun in eclipse, so that they see its image on the water, so should the souls see the beings in logoi, because they are hurt when they look at them directly. The Ideas are nothing but those which are seen in logoi. That which is compared with the Sun in the comparison, is being. This fact enables to understand why the Good makes knowledge and essence possible and why it goes beyond the essence. From the viewpoint of the Theory of Ideas, as the being makes the essence be and be determined, and as it goes beyond the essence, it is the Good as that after which all essences have to seek. On the contrary, the One in the first Hypothesis of the Parmenides neither goes beyond the essence nor does not exist in this sense, as the Neo-Platonists think, like the Good in the Comparison with the Sun, but neither exists nor is one from the outset since it is not the predicate ‘one’. That the One in the Parmenides is so, is clear from the critique on the Theory of Ideas in the first half as well as from the methode of Zeno in the transition to the second half. As the One becomes problematic because of the predicate ‘one’, it supposes on the one hand that it is, on the other hand that it is not. From this, the first Hypothesis is supposed to presume implicitly, that the One is, but since it is not one, it follows that it neither exists nor is one. Therefore, the One in the first Hypothesis is not the Idea of the Good, but it is in the second and third Hypotheses that the One is related to the being through the time as the condition for the existence. However, the relation of the One to the being in the time confronts with the difficulty of “instant” in the third Hypothesis. It is in the Sophist where Plato determines the non-being while determining what the being is that he shows more generally how the One is related to the being yet from the viewpoint of our human beings. He determines there by the three ways what the being is. The first is the dispute between the monists and the pluralists about what to be is, the second is the gigantomachia about the essence between the materialists and the friends of Forms, and the third is the dialectical determination of greatest kinds such as the being, rest, motion, etc. In these Plato determines not only what the being is but also what the non-being is. But the conclusion is, that the non-being is not something contrary to the being, but only different from it, and it itself is as antithesis of being to being only one kind of Form which bases on the essence. From this, Plato seems to take the position that nothing prohibits the One to participate in the being, because the non-being is non-being.

Divergent from the Neo-Platonic thesis on identity, the author tries with this article to elucidate the relation between the Idea of the Good in the Republic and the One in the Parmenides of Plato. The Comparison with the Sun, which elucidates the Idea of the Good in the Republic, did not firstly appear in the Republic, but had already appeared in the Phaedo, where Plato himself describes how he reached the Theory of Ideas. The Phaedo states that as eyes are hurt when looking at the sun in eclipse, so that they see its image on the water, so should the souls see the beings in logoi, because they are hurt when they look at them directly. The Ideas are nothing but those which are seen in logoi. That which is compared with the Sun in the comparison, is being. This fact enables to understand why the Good makes knowledge and essence possible and why it goes beyond the essence. From the viewpoint of the Theory of Ideas, as the being makes the essence be and be determined, and as it goes beyond the essence, it is the Good as that after which all essences have to seek. On the contrary, the One in the first Hypothesis of the Parmenides neither goes beyond the essence nor does not exist in this sense, as the Neo-Platonists think, like the Good in the Comparison with the Sun, but neither exists nor is one from the outset since it is not the predicate ‘one’. That the One in the Parmenides is so, is clear from the critique on the Theory of Ideas in the first half as well as from the methode of Zeno in the transition to the second half. As the One becomes problematic because of the predicate ‘one’, it supposes on the one hand that it is, on the other hand that it is not. From this, the first Hypothesis is supposed to presume implicitly, that the One is, but since it is not one, it follows that it neither exists nor is one. Therefore, the One in the first Hypothesis is not the Idea of the Good, but it is in the second and third Hypotheses that the One is related to the being through the time as the condition for the existence. However, the relation of the One to the being in the time confronts with the difficulty of “instant” in the third Hypothesis. It is in the Sophist where Plato determines the non-being while determining what the being is that he shows more generally how the One is related to the being yet from the viewpoint of our human beings. He determines there by the three ways what the being is. The first is the dispute between the monists and the pluralists about what to be is, the second is the gigantomachia about the essence between the materialists and the friends of Forms, and the third is the dialectical determination of greatest kinds such as the being, rest, motion, etc. In these Plato determines not only what the being is but also what the non-being is. But the conclusion is, that the non-being is not something contrary to the being, but only different from it, and it itself is as antithesis of being to being only one kind of Form which bases on the essence. From this, Plato seems to take the position that nothing prohibits the One to participate in the being, because the non-being is non-being.

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Plato, Neo-Platonism, Identity, the Good, the One, Relation, Being